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THE APPLICABILITY OF THE "NEW"
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
INVESTIGATIONS BY SECRET AGENTS:




A. The Constitution and Secret Agents
Commentators have decried the unrestrained use of various kinds
of government secret agents, police spys, agent provocatours and
stool pigeons' to gather information for the state2 since soon after the
Constitution was adopted,' but the Supreme Court did not begin to
place any direct4 restraints on this activity until recent years. The
only judicial restraint was provided by the common law defense of
entrapment. But the stiff prerequisites to this defense laid down in
Sorrells v. United States,5 barred its use in all but the most egregious
1. In this comment secret agents and police spys refer to regular members of local,
state and federal agencies working in an undercover capacity; agent provocatours are
governmental agents who pose as crime consumers and encourage a suspect to engage
in illegal activity; stool pigeons are regular informers for the government.
2. The difficult problem of ascertaining when there is sufficient state action is beyond
the scope of this paper. Special agents and informers present especially perplexing prob-
lems. The test for state action should turn on whether the operative was collecting
information and not on whether his actions had been authorized in a specific case. Past
service, past encouragement, and past payments are relevant considerations. See generally
Note, Judicial Control of Secret Agents 76 YALE L.J. 996 (1967); F. EGEN, PLAIN-
CLOTHMSIMN (1952). State action clearly exists where a special agent is working for
a regular member of a law enforcement agency, as in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747 (1953), or is sent to spy on a person and make regular reports, as in Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
3. See, e.g., F. LmBa, ON¢ CIVIL LiBEr rs AND Sar~ GovMMaxsT (1853); T. Coorxy,
CoNsTiTuTioNAL LrhITATiOws 375 (4th ed. 1878).
4. Cf. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), where the Court found a
fourth amendment violation when a secret agent seized some of Gouled's private papers
while he was temporarily out of the room. The Court's analysis indicates that the
constitutional violation was the seizure of the papers rather than the fraudulent entry.
5. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). The Court said that the defense was not available unless
the criminal design originates with the officials of the government, and they implant
in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense
and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute.
287 U.S. at 442. To establish entrapment a Court must find that the criminal conduct
was the product of the creative activity of law enforcement officials and that the de-
fendant was an unwary innocent not predisposed to commit a crime. See also Sherman
v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Masciale v. United States, 356 US. 386 (1958).
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cases of governmental solicitation of criminal activity. However, the
Supreme Court is beginning to place some limits on secret agent ac-
tivity. It is now clear that an individual has a first amendment6 right
of privacy in his associations7 which should bar some secret agent
activity. Of even greater significance are the recent fourth amendment8
cases developing a new conceptual approach to the adjudication of
fourth amendment issues,' and burying the moribund remains of most
of the rigid property oriented rules of interpretation" which had
previously excluded secret agent investigations from the amendment's
protection. However, the Court's conception of privacy in the secret
agent "transition" cases" does not fully protect all legitimate aspects
of personal privacy. This comment develops the definition of privacy
emerging from those cases into a privacy model that fully protects
personal privacy from unreasonable intrusions by secret agents.
B. The Emerging Two-step Fourth Amendment Analysis: The Issues
of Applicability and Reasonableness
In order to clearly understand the changes taking place it is
necessary to examine the two-part fourth amendment analysis recently
adopted by the Supreme Court in Camara v. San Francisco2 and Terry
v. Ohio. 3 The first step is to establish whether the fourth amendment
applies to the investigative activity in question. Stated generally, the
6. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances. U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.
7. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Talley v. California, 362 U.S.
60 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958). See also Comment, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free
Speech Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084 (1961).
8. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONST.
AMEND. IV.
9. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Camara v. San Francisco, 387 U.S.
523 (1967).
10. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) ; Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963) ; Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). For a discussion
of the property rules of applicability see text accompanying notes 22-30 infra.
11. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) ; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
12. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
13. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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issue here is whether there has been a "search and seizure" of "persons,
houses, papers and effects"1 by a person acting for or employed by the
state, without the voluntary consent of the victim of the search." In
short, was there an unconsented invasion of private property or per-
sonal privacy by an agent of the state? It is the creation and evolu-
tion of specific rules of applicability in the secret agent context that
provides the principle focus of this comment.
But an affirmative finding of applicability is not alone sufficient to
establish a fourth amendment violation. For the amendment does
not prohibit all searches and seizures-only unreasonable ones. Thus
the second step is to establish whether the government has performed
the search in a constitutionally reasonable manner. The issues here
are whether the search was based upon sufficient evidence, whether
there was adequate notice of the intended search, whether antecedent
justification before a judicial officer was necessary, and whether the
search was confined to the proper scope. 1' This problem may be termed
the question of reasonableness. To find that a particular search was
unconstitutional, a court must conclude both that the amendment
was applicable and that the search was unreasonable. The distinction is
important because of the language in Camara and Terry indicating
that the Court will apply different tests for each. As will be shown in
greater detail later, applicability depends upon whether society is
willing to recognize a person's desire to control information about
himself.IT On the other hand, the reasonableness of a particular search
is established by balancing the government's need to search against
14. U.S. CONST. AMWD. IV.
15. Consent to search is the equivalent of the waiver of a constitutional right. The
classic statement of the requirements for a waiver of a constitutional right is from-
Johnson v. Zebst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) where the Court reasoned that: "A waiver
is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege." Since Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) if a man is arrested he must
be informed of his privilege against self incrimination and his right to counsel. However
under the fourth amendment the officer need not inform a suspect that he has a right
to refuse admittance to a warrantless officer who has come to search. Yet in the latter
case there is the same lack of knowledge of one's constitutional rights, Williams v.
United States, 263 F.2d 487, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1959), the same inherent coercion, and
the same difficulty of reviewing each testimonial dispute to determine voluntariness that
moved the Court to adopt the Miranda rule. For a general analysis of this problem see
Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal after Miranda v. Arizona, 67 CoLrmr. L. Rxv.
130 (1967).
16. For an analysis of the impact of recent changes in the reasonableness rules on
secret agent activity, see text accompanying notes 149 to 162 infra.
17. See discussion in text accompanying notes 46 to 55 infra.
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the seriousness of the invasion of the victim's privacy. This dual
analysis was clearly established in Terry v. Ohio,18 where Chief
Justice Warren indicated that the proper approach is to recognize
that the fourth amendment "governs all intrusions by agents of the
public upon personal security" 9 while the reasonableness of that
intrusion is ascertained by "balancing the need to search [or seize]
against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails."2 °
C. The Original Development of Fourth Amendment Applicability
Rules
Like most of the provisions in the American Constitution, the terse
language of the fourth amendment is susceptible to differing interpreta-
tions of its breadth of application. The broadest reading of the words
"persons, houses, papers and effects" 2 would be one that found these
words to be symbolic representatives of all sources of information about
an individual and his activities that he desires to keep private. Such
information could come in any form known to man, including sight,
hearing, touch, smell, blood pressure, radioactivity, etc. "Searches and
seizures" would then refer to any information or evidence gathering
activity by the state.
On the other hand, under the narrowest possible reading of the
fourth amendment only persons, houses, private papers and personal
effects would be protected as property from trespasses and seizure by
the state. The scope of the fourth amendment's protection envisioned
by the framers is unclear, but seems to have been somewhat broader
than the latter approach.22 But when the Supreme Court first began
to formulate rules for applying the fourth amendment in this century,23
18. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
19. Id. at 18 n.15.
20. Id. at 21, citing Camara v. San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
21. U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
22. See F. LIEBER, ON Crm LIBERTIES AND SELF GOvERNmENT 76-80 (1853); J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 678-680 (3d. ed.
1858); T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 367-377 (4th ed. 1878). In Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the first fourth amendment case to reach the
Supreme Court, the Court stated that the amendment was adopted in order to provide
for the full enjoyment of the "indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty
and private property." 116 U.S. at 630.
23. Prior to the adoption of the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914), fourth amendment violations were tested in the state courts in actions
for damages; few reached the Supreme Court. The exclusionary rule caused a sharp
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it borrowed from common law property concepts 4 and narrowly limited
the scope of the fourth amendment's protection. Beginning with
Hester v. United States," the Court found the amendment applicable
only if the search occurred in a constitutionally protected place-
which was almost always privately owned20 In Olmstead v. United
States,27 the Court held that the amendment's protection of papers and
effects referred only to tangible objects not words.
At the same time that the Court was relying on the sanctity of
property to protect privately owned places and chattels, it imported
from common law trespass doctrine rules governing the manner in
which the property could be unlawfully invaded. The rules of appli-
cability that were formulated required either an unconsented28 physical
entry29 into a protected area, or the seizure of a tangible object without
the consent of its possessor3 0 As is set forth in detail in Section II, the
Court upheld all manner of deceptive and guileful searches by secret
agents on the grounds that the fraudulent entry did not vitiate the
occupant's consent and render the entry a trespass.31
increase in the number of Supreme Court cases construing the amendment, and hence
systematic rules began to be developed.
24. There are three separate reasons that probably account for this approach. The
first is the legal milieu in which the Court operated. Rights of privacy were generally
unrecognized at common law while property rights of private use and control were
well established. But see Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HA V. L. REv.
193 (1890). A second explanation for the Court's approach is that prior to the exclu-
sionary rule the reasonableness of an official search was usually tested in a trespass action
measuring unconsented physical entries into private places. For examples of these trespass
actions see Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40 (1814); Sanford v. Nichols, 13 Mass.
286 (1816); Reed v. Rice, 25 Ky. (2 Marsh) 44, 19 Am. Dec. 122 (1829). The Court
simply thought about the problem in that context. The third reason is probably the
fact that the wooden rules of property law adopted by the Court were easy to apply.
The judicial task was immensely simplified.
25. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
26. In a few cases courts found constitutional protection for places not privately
owned but where a person had a right of private use and control. See, e.g., United
States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (desk in government office); United
States v. Stone, 232 F. Supp. 396 (ND. Tex. 1964) (phone booth); Britt v. Superior
Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d 817 (1962), and Bielieki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d
602, 371 P.2d 288 (1962) (public toilet).
27. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
28. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483 (1964).
29. See e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 US. 438 (1928).
30. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 US. 307 (1959); Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
31. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 US. 293 (1966); Lopez v. United States,
373 US. 427 (1963) ; On Lee v. United States, 343 US. 747 (1952).
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PRIVACY MODEL
A. The Housecleaning Effort in Katz v. United States
In Katz v. United States32 the Supreme Court "administered the
formal coup de grace to the moribund doctrine" 3 that had controlled
the applicability of the fourth amendment since Olmstead. In Katz,
FBI agents, acting without a warrant, had attached a microphone to
the top of a public phone booth in order to monitor the conversations
of a suspect thought to be involved in interstate gambling. The Court
held that the fourth amendment was applicable to these facts. Affirm-
ing the trend of the recent cases,34 Mr. Justice Stewart, for the
majority, discarded the requirement of a "physical intrusion" into
a protected enclosure and effectively overruled Olmstead and Goldman
v. United States35 insofar as those cases established that a trespass
was a precondition to a finding that the amendment applied.38 Having
cast aside the trespass requirement, he reiterated the recent holding in
Wong Sun v. United States37 that the protection of the amendment
was not limited to tangible objects, but extended as well to oral
statements. In Wong Sun the Court had approved a circuit court deci-
sion3" that information obtained visually was also within the scope of
the amendment.3" Now all of the traditional sources of information
about a person-his acts, words and personal property-which he
does not intend to disclose publicly, may be the subject of an un-
reasonable search and seizure.
In Katz the Court was also asked to decide whether a public tele-
phone booth was a "constitutionally protected area."40 This phrase,
reasoned Mr. Justice Stewart, is an incantation that does not neces-
sarily promote a solution to fourth amendment problems. What the
fourth amendment protects, he reasoned, is "people, not places."'"
32. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
33. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 269 (1968) (dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Fortas).
34. See Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) and Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505 (1961).
35. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
36. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
37. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
38. McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1955).
39. 371 U.S. at 485.
40. 389 U.S. 347, 349 (1967).
41. Id. at 351.
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Therefore, what a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own house
or office, is not a subject of fourth amendment protection ...
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area acces-
sible to the public may be constitutionally protected.
Thus it is the degree of exposure of information to the general public
that provides the principle indicator of fourth amendment privacy.
This language gives a general indication of how such issues will be
approached by the Court in the future. The implication from the term
"may" that the Court will apply an objective test is further substan-
tiated by Mr. Justice Stewart's statement that the defendant had
"justifiably relied" upon the security of the telephone booth." Mr.
Justice Harlan, concurring, proposed a somewhat clearer test when he
reasoned that there must be an "actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and. . . [it must] be one that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable."' "4 A later decision indicates that this is the test the
Court will follow.45 Thus the amendment protects the information that
a reasonable and prudent man would not consider was exposed to the
public.
B. The Nature of Fourth Amendment Privacy
The premise of the Court in Katz that the fourth amendment pro-
tects people not places is extremely appealing, but ambiguous. What is
the nature of this personal interest that the amendment protects?
The defendant had framed the issue as a question involving his fourth
amendment "right to privacy."'40 Mr. Justice Stewart rejected this
formulation on the grounds that the fourth amendment did not protect
a "general constitutional 'right to privacy' " since it protected other
interests besides personal privacy, including personal property and
freedom from unreasonable arrests4 7
42. Id. at 351-2.
43. Id. at 353.
44. Id. at 361. The right turns on the actual intent of the victim of the search bemuse
of the way that it is defined: as a right to control information about ourselves. If a
person has no intention to control certain information and exposes it publicly then there
is no constitutional difficulty. His intention will be inferred from his conduct under
the totality of the circumstances.
45. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) ; Terry v. Ohio, 392 US. 1, 9 (1968).
46. 389 U.S. 347, 349 (1967).
47. Id. at 350-51.
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One writer has recently proposed a definition of privacy as the
"control we have over information about ourselves." 8 Under this
definition fourth amendment privacy would encompass control over
all sources of personal information, from words and acts to blood
pressure and body temperature, which had not been exposed to the
public. The protection of personal property is also encompassed within
this definition. When material things are seized by the state the victim's
loss is not the monetary value of the objects, but their value as in-
formation under his exclusive control. Indeed the state often has no
interest in their monetary value at all.49 Under this view of privacy, the
Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test would apply to all forms
of governmental searches. However, Mr. Justice Stewart's view that
the fourth amendment protects other interests besides privacy is
correct for the Court has long recognized that the amendment also
protects an individual's right to the "possession and control of his
person"-his liberty-from arbitrary arrests or detentions.50
The view of privacy proposed here is rooted in man's biological and
physiological nature. Through autonomy a person maintains his
personal integrity by keeping inviolate his ultimate secrets.51 Within
the intimacy of small groups and close relationships an individual is
able to overcome the isolation of the human condition."' Private
conversations, which are often characterized by "exaggeration, obscen-
ity, agreeable falsehoods, and expression of antisocial desires not
seriously meant, ' 53 also provide a form of social release. An individual's
ability to cut himself off from the general public and the state is a
prerequisite to his entering intimate relationships."4 For the essence
of intimacy is the sharing of emotions and information not revealed
to the public or more casual acquaintances. The extent to which an
48. Fried, Privacy, 77 YATE LJ. 473, 482 (1968).
49. However, when the items seized are contraband or stolen goods the state does
have some interest in the material value of the goods.
50. Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) citing Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
51. A. WEsTN, PiVACY AND FREEDOM 33 (1967). See also E. Gos-mrANr, Tim
PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LmsE 69-70 (1959); K. LEWn, RESOLVING Soc=.
CoNnrzc'rs 18-33 (1948).
52. See generally E. Faomrmr, TiH ART OF LovnG (1956); E. Faoirii, Escam Ftom
FR o, ch. II (1941).
53. PRESIDENT'S TASx FORCE REPoR or ORGANIZED CRIME 96 (1966).
54. See generally A. WEsTIN, supra note 51, ch. 2.
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individual controls or discloses personal information delineates the
degree and the nature of his interaction with other members of so-
ciety.55 Some respect for this control is therefore indispensable to a
healthy society.
C. Quantity and Quality of Privacy
The average member of our society would probably consider that a
breach of his privacy had occurred when an unwanted person intruded
into his private affairs or when a friend or business acquaintance had
broken a trust and disclosed private facts or communications to others.
Privacy, defined as "control over information about ourselves," would
thus include both control over the extent to personal information will
be acquired by others, and control over the extent to which a known
recipient of information will pass it on to a third person.50 The first
deals with the quantity of one's privacy while the second deals with
the quality of privacy.
The right of privacy in American tort law has long protected both
of these elements of privacy.57 The tort of "intrusion" protects the
quantity of a person's privacy from eavesdropping and spying in
windows,5" wiretapping, 9 and the use of recording devices."0 The tort
of "publication" protects the quality of a person's privacy from the
publication of private letters and other personal papers,61 pictures
from a doctor's file s2 and personal information about an individual's
55. A. Wzs%=, supra note 51, ch, 2.
56. A number of commentators have recognized that privacy includes both of these
elements. See, e.g., ABA EcoTRoNic SuRvaEnxcz 125 (1968); Supreme Court 1966
Term, 81 HAnv. L. REv. 125 (1967); A. WEsTin, PRiVACY Aiw FInoxzo 375 (1967), In
their famous article, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890). Warren and
Brandeis wrote ". . . [E]ach individual [ought to have] the right of determining,
ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments and emotions shall be communicated
to others .... [A~nd even if he has chosen to give them expression, he . . . [ought to
retain] the power to fix the limits of the publicity which shall be given them." 4 HARV.
L. REv. 193, 198.
57. See, e.g., Prosser, The Right of Privacy in American Tort Law, 48 CoLTT-. L.
R.v. 713 (1948); S. HoisTADT= mo G. Honowrrz, Ttm Ri GT op P=i.Acr (1964);
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CA iF. L. REv. 383 (1960).
58. Pinkerton National Detective Agency, Inc. v. Stevens, 108 Ga. App. 159, 132
S.E.2d 119 (1963),
59. Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931); LeCrone v. Ohio Bell
Telephone Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 201 N.E.2d 533 (1963).
60. Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964).
61. Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story 100, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C, Mass. 1841); Denis v. Leclerc,
1 Martin 30 (La. 1811).
62. Griffin v. Medical Society, 11 N.Y.S2d 109 (Sup. CL 1939) publication in medical
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past.63 The tort of "appropriation" protects against the use of a per-
son's name or likeness for advertising.64 Other common law rules also
protect these two elements of privacy. The law of trespass protects the
quantity of a person's privacy, at least on his private property" The
evidentiary privileges, at criminal as well as civil trials, protect the
quality of an individual's privacy by prohibiting divulgence of personal
information in the court room.66 Despite this rich common law back-
ground protecting communications against divulgence, the Court has
consistently refused to find any fourth amendment protection against
divulgence. In Section III this comment will propose a privacy model
of applicability that will include a systematic theory of quantity of
privacy in secret agent cases and some protection for private communi-
cations to close friends who become government informers. Before
doing so, however, it will be first necessary to examine how some -of the
various secret agent issues have been treated by the Court in the past.
II. SECRET AGENTS IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. The Trespass Analysis in the Early Cases
The first secret agent case reaching the Supreme Court was Gouled
v. United States67 where a business associate turned government agent
entered the defendant's office after falsely representing that he only
intended to pay a social call. When the defendant temporarily left the
room, the agent searched through the defendant's desk and seized
some incriminating papers that were used against him at trial.
It is important to keep in mind that there were two separate con-
sent issues in Gouled. First, did the agent's deception regarding his
journal of pictures of plaintiff's deformed nose); Feeney v. Young, 191 App. Div. 501,
181 N.Y.S. 481 (1920) (public exhibition of films of caesarian operation).
63. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
64. See, e.g., Cases cited in Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALi'. L. REv. 383, 401-06 (1960).
65. Although this comment makes a distinction between property and privacy for
purposes of analyzing the recent change in fourth amendment protection the distinction
should not be over-emphasized. For both concepts stem from similar goals. Namely,
to provide an individual a zone of secrecy from other persons where he may fulfill human
needs for intimacy and anonymity and second, to provide an enclave of freedom from
governmental interference with his liberty. For an excellent analysis of this second
function of property see Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
66. See, e.g., C. McCoR'rzcx, EvIDENcE ch. 8 (1954).
67. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
794
Vol. 45: 785, 1970
Investigations by Secret Agents
true purpose vitiate the defendant's consent to his entry? Second, did
the agent search for and seize the papers without the defendant's
consent? The Court's failure to separate and resolve both of these
issues has engendered a great deal of subsequent confusion.68 Although
the Court said in dictum that entries by stealth (without the occupant's
knowledge) were as unlawful as forceable entries,69 it otherwise
ignored the nature of the entry. Instead the Court decried the rum-
maging search of the defendant's desk without his knowledge and
reasoned that
whether entrance to the home or office of a person suspected of
crime be obtained.., by stealth, or through social acquaintance,
or in the guise of a business call . . . any search and seizure
subsequently and secretly made in his absence, falls within the
scope of the Fourth Amendment... 70
When a case involved the seizure of a tangible object without the
owner's consent the manner of the original entry was seemingly
irrevelant.
The significance of a fraudulent entry alone was decided in On Lee
v. United States.71 There Chin Poy, an old acquaintance and former
employee of the defendant, became a government informer and was
equipped by the Federal Narcotics Bureau with a hidden microphone
and transmitting device. He twice entered On Lee's laundry so
equipped and solicited incriminating admissions from On Lee which
were transmitted to a Bureau agent outside. The principle point of
contention between the government and the defendant was whether
Chin Poy was a trespasser or not.'- The Court accepted the govern-
68. In Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), Hoffa v. United States 385 U.S.
293 (1966), and Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) the defendant argued that
Gouled placed some limitations on guileful entries. In Hoffa, Mr. Justice Stewart agreed
but distinguished Gouled. See text accompanying notes 91-92 infra. In Lewis, Chief
Justice Warren's reasoning indicates that he believes only the second issue was resolved
by the Gouled Court. 385 U.S. at 210-11. Mr. justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Fortas
failed to concur with this part of Chief Justice Warren's analysis. 385 U.S. at 213. See
text accompanying notes 105 to 107 infra. The commentators have also failed to
clearly separate these two issues. See, e.g., Note, Judicial Control of Secret Agents, 76
YAL LJ. 994 (1967).
69. 255 U.S. 298, 305 (1921).
70. Id. at 306.
71. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
72. Brief for Appellant at 19-22, Brief for Respondant at 12-13, On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
795
Washington Law Review
ment's position and sustained the defendant's conviction. Mr. Justice
Jackson, for the majority, reasoned that Chin Poy's deceit concerning
his real purposes and his transmission of the conversation did not
vitiate On Lee's consent and render his entry a trespass."3
However, the Court did not strictly adhere to the property mode of
analysis since logically the presence of the hidden microphone was
an unconsented invasion-a trespass. "4 In fact, in Goldman the Supreme
Court had strongly implied that a hidden microphone could constitute
a trespasser. But in On Lee, only Mr. Justice Burton, in dissent, took
this position, arguing that the microphone's trespass made the Bureau
agent's testimony inadmissible.7 1 Yet to the majority, the presence
of the microphone on the person of the secret agent eliminated any
possible constitutional difficulty.
Gould implied that a fraudulent entry by a business associate turned
government agent did not raise any fourth amendment questions
while On Lee held that guileful entries by friends turned informer
were not within the scope of the amendment's protections. The tres-
pass analysis of the Court clearly offered suspects little personal
security from secret agent investigations.
In Lopez v. United States,76 the deception was not the use of a
secret agent, but the use of a Minifon miniature tape recorder by an
Internal Revenue agent to record a bribe attempt in the office of the
defendant's night club. At the trial Davis, the agent, testified, and the
tape was admitted as independent evidence.
The first question before the Supreme Court was the admissibility
of Davis' testimony. The defendant alleged that Davis had gained
access to Lopez's office by representing his willingness to take a bribe,
and that this misrepresentation constituted a violation of the fourth
amendment. Mr. Justice Harlan, for the Court, reasoned that there was
no unlawful invasion since Davis was in the office with Lopez's con-
sent and the consent was not vitiated simply because Davis' apparent
willingness to take a bribe was not real.
The deception in Lopez did not relate to the agent's identity as in
73. 343 U.S. 747, 752 (1951).
74. See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
75. 343 U.S. 747, 766-67 (1951).
76. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
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On Lee, since here the defendant at least knew he was talking to a
government agent. Rather the deception was the agent's intent to
divulge his conversation with Davis to other government officials and in
court. The Court dismissed this issue by simply asserting that a person
"assumed the risk" that his words would be divulged to others. 7 The
Court left unanswered the question of why the defendant was deemed
to have assumed the risk; indeed, under the property analysis that
question need not arise. Since the agent had not entered or searched in
an intrusive manner, the fourth amendment was not applicable and
thus Davis could testify against the defendant.
The second issue 78 before the Court was the admissibility of the
recording. The defendant argued that the use of the Minifon was
electronic eavesdropping, similar to the use of the spike mike in the
party wall which was disapproved by the Court in Silverman v. United
States."0 But Mr. Justice Harlan reasoned for the Court that the
presence of the recorder was not an unlawful invasion since the Mini-
fon was carried in with the agent, who was lawfully present, and it
heard only what he heard. Mr. Justice Brennan dissented in Lopez"°
reasoning that the recorder was not merely incidental to the agent's
lawful presence since after it was authenticated the recording was ad-
missible as independent evidence of Lopez's statements, not merely for
purposes of corroboration. As in On Lee, the Court decided that the
device was not a trespasser.
Mr. justice Harlan interpreted the defendant's argument to imply
that he had a constitutional right to rely on possible flaws in the
agent's testimony from memory; he summarily dismissed this impli-
cation by asserting that Lopez assumed the risk that the conversation
"would be accurately reproduced in Court, whether by faultless
memory or mechanical recording.""'
Chief Justice Warren wrote a separate concurring opinion82 in which
77. Id. at 439.
78. The court did not discuss the issue whether the office was a constitutionally pro-
tected place, probably because it was so clearly established that it could be. See, e.g.,
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). Nor did it reach the issue whether words
could be the object of a search. But the clear implication of Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), was that they could.
79. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
80. 373 U.S. 427, 446 (1963).
81. Id. at 439.
82. Id. at 441.
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he suggested that the Court should use its supervisory power to care-
fully review the use of secret agents and electronic devices. He agreed
with Mr. Justice Brennan that On Lee should be overruled, but he
approved the use of recorders to support the credibility of government
agents against persons seeking to corrupt them.
The dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan 83 rejected the prop-
erty analysis of the majority and the prior cases. What the fourth
amendment protected, reasoned Mr. Justice Brennan, was a right of
privacy that embraced the concept of liberty of communications recog-
nized in the first, fourth and fifth amendments. This liberty of com-
munications was especially threatened by the new electronic devices
which can potentially destroy "all anonymity and all privacy" and
make "government privy to everything that goes on."'84 In addition,
widespread use of electronic devices would have a chilling effect on
personal communications. The privacy model which Mr. Justice
Brennan proposed would make the fourth amendment applicable to
all electronically secured evidence, but excluded all non-electronic
eavesdropping and the use of secret agents since, in his view, such
invasions of privacy were not so serious. The testimony of secret agents
at a criminal trial was not an invasion of privacy since, except with
respect to privileged communications, each party to a conversation
takes "the risk of divulgence by the other." With respect to divul-
gence, Mr. Justice Brennan's privacy approach was the same as the
property analysis. The fourth amendment was not applicable.
B. The Transition to a Privacy Analysis: Hoffa, Lewis and Osborn
The most recent secret agent cases heard by the Court were decided
in December, 1966.85 In them the Supreme Court took a hesitant half-
step toward a right-of-privacy analysis. Yet in all three cases the
Court took an extremely narrow view of what constituted an invasion
of privacy. The privacy analysis which resulted is little different from
the property analysis previously utilized.
83. Id. at 446.
84. Id. at 471.
85. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293 (1966); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966). See generally Greenawalt,
The Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping, 68 CoLum. L. Rlv. 189 (1968);
Note, Judicial Control of Secret Agents, 76 YALE L.J. 994 (1967); The Supreme Court
1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REV. 115, 125, 186, 192 (1967).
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Hoffa v. United States88 arose out of the activities of one Edward
Partin, a Teamster Union official secretly working for the FBI,87 who
had been a member of the James Hoffa entourage in Nashville, Ten-
nessee during a trial for alleged misappropriation of union funds.
Partin's testimony concerning statements he had heard in Hoffa's hotel
suite and elsewhere was offered to support the government's subse-
quent case against Hoffa for jury bribery.
Hoffa's attorneys argued that Partin's listening and watching had
been an illegal search of the hotel suite since Partin's fraud regarding
his purposes had vitiated the consent that Hoffa had given him to
enter. The Court rejected this analysis and affirmed the conviction. 8
Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court is an intermixture of
property and privacy analysis. He admits that a hotel room could be
the "object of fourth amendment protection," 9 but then shifts his
focus and asserts that what the fourth amendment protects is the
"security a man relies upon when he places himself ... within a con-
stitutionally protected area. .. .,,11 Since Partin was present by invi-
tation and heard only what was "directed to him or knowingly carried
on in his presence," the defendant "was not relying on the security
86. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
87. Because of the sudden dismissal of prior federal and state criminal charges
against Partin, his consultations with the FBI prior to and during his stay in Nashville,
and the 1,200 received from the government by his wife, the court proceeded upon the
assumption that he was a government informer while he was in Nashville.
Mr. Justice Clark, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, wrote a separate opinion in which
he argued that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted and
accept the findings of the lower court that Partin was not placed into Hoffa's secret
counsels. It is not clear whether this is a test of state action or a manner of search that
would not violate the amendment. If it was intended as a test of state action it is far
too limited and the Court was right in rejecting it. 385 U.S. at 321.
88. The defendant also argued that -the deceit violated his privilege against self-
incrimination and Partin's intrusion into the attorney-client relationship violated his
sixth amendment right to counsel. The Court rejected his self-incrimination argument
on the grounds that there was no compulsion. But cf. Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion for
the Court in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) where he assumes that
questioning by an informer constitutes an interrogation and hints that such deception
could violate the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court in Hoffa rejected the
argument that Partin's communications to the FBI during the trial denied the defendant
the effective assistance of counsel. The Court assumed that if the first Hoffa trial in 1963
had resulted in a conviction this would have been sufficient ground to set it aside, but
reasoned that this constitutional violation did not affect the incriminatory statements
about jury bribery which Partin heard. There are cases where a conviction has been
set aside on appeal where a secret agent is involved in the defendant's trial preparation.
See, e.g., Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Circ. 1953); Coplon v. United
States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
89. 385 U.S. 293, 301.
90. Id. at 301.
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of his hotel suite. . . 21*" To demonstrate this, Mr. Justice Stewart
notes that Partin did not enter by force or by stealth, or overhear
conversations by surreptitious eavesdropping. Rather he was there
by invitation. Thus Mr. Justice Stewart uses the manner of the search
not as an independent test of applicability as was done under the
property model, but to indicate whether the defendant relied upon
the privacy of a protected place. At one point he relies upon Gouled
for the proposition that guileful entries can violate the fourth amend-
ment,92 but he does not indicate when deceit would vitiate an invita-
tion and violate a person's privacy. His quantum of privacy analysis
implies that a fraudulently obtained invitation is irrelevant.
Mr. Justice Stewart concluded the majority opinion by relying
upon that portion of Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent in Lopez93 where
he agreed with the Lopez majority that the fourth amendment does
not protect "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom
he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it."'94
In Lewis v. United States,95 the alleged constitutional violation was
the use of evidence obtained by an undercover federal narcotics agent,
Edward Cass, to convict the defendant of a violation of the marijuana
laws. After first obtaining an invitation by falsely identifying him-
self as one "Jimmy the Pollack" who had been directed to the defen-
dant by a mutual friend, the agent twice visited Lewis' home and pur-
chased marijuana. The defendant relied on Gouled v. United States"0
as support for an argument that he had a right of privacy to be secure
in his home from all governmental entries-unless he properly con-
sented. Since Cass had concealed his true identity the consent was
ineffective as a waiver of a constitutional right.
Chief Justice Warren, for the Court, thought that Gouled was dis-
tinguishable since the constitutional violation in that case was the
general ransacking search while the defendant was out of the room,
not the guileful entry of a government agent. The Chief Justice
reasoned that Lewis' privacy had not been violated by the fraudulent
91. Id. at 302.
92. Id. at 301.
93. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 450 (1963).
94. 385 U.S. at 302.
95. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
96. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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entry since the petitioner's only concern was whether the agent was a
"willing purchaser who could pay the agreed price." 97 During neither
visit did the agent "see, hear, or take anything that was not contem-
plated... as a necessary part"' 8 of the business. The pretense merely
"encouraged the suspect to say things which he was willing and
anxious to say"99 to any customer of his business. "[A] government
agent," asserted Chief Justice Warren, "may accept an invitation to
do business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes
contemplated by the occupant" in "the same manner as a private
person.""' The import of this language is that any use of a fake
identity is permissible so long as the agent sees, hears and obtains
only what the members of his adopted class do. Chief Justice Warren's
view of privacy may be too limited. A person intends to disclose in-
formation only to actual members of certain classes of persons, not
to phony ones. The agent simply was not "Jimmy the Pollack" a
marijuana consumer. Whether this should make a difference is dis-
cussed below.101
Chief Justice Warren's final rationale is somewhat ambiguous. He
admitted that a home is normally protected by the fourth amend-
ment but he reasoned that when the home is converted into a com-
mercial center to which outsiders are invited as customers, "that
business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it was carried on
in a store,. . . or on the street.102 The Chief Justice probably did not
intend to imply that the police could make any search they wished in
a commercial place. Rather he may have been simply restating in a
slightly different way his theory set forth in the first part of the
opinion. That is, that the privacy of a business is measured by the
amount of information willingly exposed to its customers-including
phony ones.
Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice Fortas, concurred solely
on the grounds that the defendant's home was not a constitutionally
protected area in this case because he had opened "his home to the
97. 385 U.S. at 210.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 212.
100. Id. at 211.
101. See text accompanying notes 123 to 127, infra.
102. 385 US. at 211.
801
Washington Law Review
transaction of business."'1 3 The government agent entered the premises
for the "very purpose contemplated by the occupant and took nothing
away except what would have been taken by any willing purchaser."'"
Mr. Justice Brennan seems to be saying essentially the same thing
as Chief Justice Warren. But his refusal to join with Chief Justice
Warren's construction of Gouled indicates that he still adheres to his
dissenting view in Ker v. California0 5 that Gouled places some limi-
tations on more egregious fraudulent entries. Perhaps he would follow
the distinction often made in the lower federal courts where the fourth
amendment was applied to "affirmative misrepresentations of the
agent's identity," but not to entries of officers posing as customers or
clients.' However, as discussed earlier, 1 7 Gouled is not a proper
authority for that mode of analysis. A close analysis of the Gouled
opinion discloses that Chief Justice Warren's construction is the cor-
rect one.
In Osborn v. United States'05 the issue was the admissibility of a
tape recording of a conversation between Z. T. Osborn, one of James
Hoffa's attorneys during the same Nashville labor trial from which
Hoffa v. United States0 9 arose, and Robert Vick, a Nashville police-
man hired by the defendant as an investigator. After Vick reported
to the Justice Department that the defendant was planning to bribe
one of the jurors, authorization was obtained from two federal dis-
trict judges to hide a tape recorder on Vick's person, which eventually
recorded several incriminating statements.
In affirming Osborn's conviction for jury bribery, the Court rea-
soned that this case did not involve eavesdropping, but the "use by one
party of a device to make an accurate record of a conversation about
which that party later testified,""' as had occurred in Lopez. But Mr.
Justice Stewart, for the Court, indicated that it need not rest its
decision on the "broad foundation" of Lopez since there was also
103. Id. at 213.
104. Id.
105. 374 U.S. 23, 53 (1963).
States v. Reckis, 119 F. Supp. 687 (D. Mass. 1954); United States v. Mitcbnick, 2 F.
106. Fraternal Order of Eagles v. United States, 57 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1932); United
Supp. 225 (M.D. Penn. 1933).
107. See text at notes 67 to 70, supra.
108. 385 U.S. at 323.
109. Id. at 293.
110. Id. at 327.
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present in this case the prior judicial authorization which the Lopez
dissenters had thought necessary.111 Like most alternative holdings,
it is hard to tell which is stronger. The Court had relied upon Lopez
to find that the amendment was not applicable; then it had assumed
that the fourth amendment was applicable, but found that the search
was reasonable. The continued reliance upon Lopez indicates that
some members of the Court still thought that the recorder did not
affect the quantity of the defendant's privacy, but was simply an aid
to the secret agent's ability to accurately testify. Thus it only effected
the agent's ability to divulge the conversation, which the Court had
been saying since Lopez was outside the fourth amendment.
III. SECRET AGENTS AND THE PRIVACY MODEL
A. Quantity of Privacy and Secret Agents
In the previous section the secret agent cases decided by the Su-
preme Court were critically analyzed. In this section, the privacy
theory of applicability is applied to some of the major issues and new
guidelines for fourth amendment protection against secret agent in-
vestigations are proposed.
1. The Basic Consent Problem
The quantity of an individual's privacy was measured in Katz by
what one reasonably expects is not exposed to the public. In non-
secret agent cases the quantity of privacy is simply related to presence.
The quantity of a person's privacy is measured by the number of
persons and/or devices that he willingly permits to be present or
should reasonably expect will receive information from him. Thus
when the police forcibly enter 4 home or hide a microphone in one
of the rooms, there is an invasion of the quantity of a person's privacy.
However, in secret agent cases the issue is different. The agent's
presence alone does not invade the quantity of a person's privacy
because he is there with the individual's consent-albeit a fraudulently
obtained consent. We must go beyond mere presence and ask whether




agent, and often regarding his true identity, vitiates the consent 2
and violates the quantity of a person's privacy.113
2. Employment as a Government Agent
Is the fourth amendment applicable per se to the use of a secret
agent? In Mancusi v. DeForte"4 Mr. Justice Harlan relied on Katz
for the proposition that a person's privacy was protected under the
fourth amendment whenever he had a "reasonable expectation of
freedom from governmental intrusion.""' 5 It is possible to argue from
this language that whenever a person does not know or should not
reasonably have known that he was disclosing information to a govern-
ment agent his privacy has been invaded. Under this construction the
fourth amendment would apply to all information gathering activities
of the state unless there was a voluntary consent to search given to a
person who had identified himself as a state officer. This is exactly
the argument made by the defendant and rejected by the Court in
Lewis v. United States."6 Katz is consistent with Lewis on this ques-
tion. The fourth amendment is not applicable to all governmental in-
vestigations. It applies only to the gathering of information that is
not exposed to the public. In Katz the Court reasoned that what a
person "knowingly exposes to the public" is not constitutionally pro-
tected."' In Lewis, Chief Justice Warren stated that a government
agent "may accept an invitation to do business and may enter upon
the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant" in
112. The consent question here is not the equivalent of the issue of waiver of a
fourth amendment right. For a discussion of that separate question see note 15 supra.
Rather, the consent question here relates to the issue whether the fourth amendment
applies in the first place. In other words, did the person knowingly expose information
to the public. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1966).
113. In five of the six secret agent cases decided by the Supreme Court, discussed
supra in text at notes 67 to 111, there was concealment of the secret agent's employment
with the government. The lone exception is Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)
where the defendant knew Davis, the agent. In Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S.
323 (1966) the defendant knew he was talking to a police officer but did not know the
officer was also working with the Justice Department. Thus he was deceived con-
cerning the officer's true employment. In only one of the six cases, Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) was there deception of the agent's identity.
114. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
115. Id. at 368.
116. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
117. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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the same manner as any member of the public. 18 Mr. Justice Harlan's
statement in Mancusi must be read in this context. When a govern-
ment agent enters a place open to members of the public and sees
and hears what everyone else does, he is not "intruding."
The class of persons permitted to receive information may be
smaller than every member of the public. In Hoffa v. United States,"9
the class of persons -permitted to join the Hoffa entourage and receive
information concerning the trial defense included union officials, at-
torneys, and friends. Since Partin was actually a member of that class
and heard or saw only what was willingly exposed to the class, he
did not intrude upon the quantity of defendant Hoffa's privacy. How-
ever, Partin's prior meeting with the FBI, and his intent to divulge to
the Justice Department any information he obtained certainly affected
the quality of Hoffa's privacy. This problem is considered below." 0
Even if a government agent enters as a member of the public or
of a more limited class it could be argued that there is still fraud or
deception, which should be controlled by the fourth amendment. The
deception lies in the agent's failure to inform the victim of his search
that he is actually working for the state. This is certainly a lesser
kind of deception than the affirmative misrepresentation of identity
that occurred in Lewis, but it is still a deception. Such tactics are
wrong, it could be argued, since the deception involved is prima facie
unethical or unfair. The unarticulated social premise supporting this
argument is that deception in social relations is generally harmful.'
Yet it is difficult to find anything prima facie unfair with this passive
deception. If the argument were to prevail, a plainclothesman walking
into a drug store open to the public that sold liquor without the re-
quired tax stamps would have to call out his identity at the door. Yet
any customer could see the illegal liquor for sale. Government agents
would have less power to investigate than would the average citizenl
A second problem with the argument is that it fails to take into
account the possibility of countervailing reasons justifying the decep-
118. 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966).
119. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
120. See text accompanying notes 139 to 148 infra.
121. Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping, 68
CoLum. L. Rav. 189, 216-17 (1968).
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tion. Deception in a particular situation may be worthwhile-such as
where a small deception is used to save a human life.
The Court could have chosen to decide the reasonableness of a
particular search and seizure by balancing the deception, force or
other arbitrary police tactics against the need to search or seize,
but it did not do so. The threshold issue under the Katzian analysis
of the fourth amendment is whether a person has exposed information
to the public. The nature of the police conduct is relevant to a reso-
lution of that question, but its fairness or unfairness in itself is
irrelevant.122
3. Deception as to Identity
In the previous section it was concluded that if a member of the
public or a more limited class failed to disclose their secret employ-
ment as a government agent, there was no intrusion into the quantity
of a person's privacy. But what if a person fraudulently misrepresents
his identity in order to join the class? The threshold problem here is
defining the extent of the class permitted to receive the information
sought to be suppressed. In Lewis v. United States,'2' the Court
reasoned that the class included all members of the public since Lewis'
only concern was whether the agent was a willing purchaser of mari-
juana.124 The facts do not support the Court's analysis. Lewis was
not operating a public drugstore. He was operating a business that
was restricted to persons he knew, or who were referred to him by
mutual friends, who purchased and used marijuana. To gain entrance
to the defendant's home agent Cass had to fraudulently misrep-
resent both his identity and that he had been referred by a mutual
friend. The agent was not a member of the class of persons to whom
Lewis intended to disclose information.
The Court's "member of the public" rule could be reasonably ap-
122. Under the property approach the courts evaluated the fairness of the manner
of the governmental invasion. Under the privacy model the ethics of the investigative
activity is irrelevant. The privacy analysis means that even inadvertent and uninten-
tional governmental activity may interfere with a person's privacy if it unearths infor-
mation which he could reasonably expect to control. See Note, From Private Places to
Personal Privacy: A Post Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 968, 981 (1968). But see Note, Judicial Control of Secret Agents, 76 YALE L.J.
994 (1967); Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping, 68
CoLum. L. REv. 189 (1968).
123. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
124. Id. at 210-11.
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plied in some consumer crime situations. If an illegal gambling estab-
lishment was open to anyone who walked in the door, then a secret
agent could come in and gamble, and gather information in the same
manner as any member of the public. Nothing would be exposed to
him that was not exposed to any customer off the street. But where
an agent assumes a false identity in order to gain entrance to a closed
game, he would be intruding upon the privacy of the individuals
participating.
The class analysis is also useful outside the consumer crime area.
If Edward Partin, the secret agent in Hoffa v. United States, 5 had
been unknown outside of his Louisiana local union, the FBI could
have kept him in jail in that state and attempted to place an agent
posing as Partin into the Hoffa entourage. This misrepresentation of
identity would have violated Hoffa's privacy since the class of persons
he intended to disclose information to included only union officials,
attorneys, and friends. A somewhat cryptic footnote in Hoffa126 may
indicate the Court's approval of the above analysis. Moreover, several
lower federal court cases have found the fourth amendment applicable
where a secret agent used a false identity.2 7
The foregoing analysis has focused upon the individual's expectation
of privacy in each situation. But it is also important to focus upon
what the impact to our society as a whole would be if such fraudulent
and deceptive practices are sanctioned. The unrestrained use of secret
agents seemingly sanctioned by Lewis could have a chilling effect on
all small group activity and interpersonal relationships.
B. The Participant Monitor
The participant monitor, of course, is not a pure secret agent case
but is included here because of the frequency that secret agents are
125. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
126. "The applicability of the fourth amendment if Partin had been a stranger to
the petitioner is a question we do not decide. Cf. Lewis v. United States. . . 2' 385
U.S. 293, 302 (1966). If Partin had obtained consent simply as an unknown union
official there would have been no deceit about his identity. Hoffa would have exposed
the same information to him that he would normally have exposed to unknown officials
from the local unions. If Partin had been a stranger there could be no argument that
the quality of the defendant's privacy was abridged. See text accompanying notes 139
to 148 infra.
127. Fraternal Order of Eagles v. United States, 57 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1932) (agents
posed as members of a private lodge); United States v. Reckis, 119 F. Supp. 687 (D.
Mass. 1954) (posed as repairmen for a still); United States v. Mitchnick, 2 F. Supp.
225 (M.D. Penn. 1932) (posed as refrigerator salesmen).
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equipped with mechanical recording or transmitting devices. Secret
agents equipped with such devices are expressly excluded from the
probable cause and prior judicial authorization requirements for elec-
tronic surveillance in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968.128 Is that exception constitutional after
Katz? In his concurring opinion in Katz, Mr. Justice White stated his
view that the previous cases approving the use of participant monitors
were unaffected by the Katz decision.'29 But the majority opinion need
not be so narrowly construed.
In Katz the Court reasoned that the defendant had a right to rely
upon the security of the phone booth against the "uninvited ear" of
the recording device which was placed on the top of the phone booth. 3
The situation in On Lee v. United States,'3' where the microphone
hidden on the secret agent transmitted the conversation directly to a
federal official outside the laundry, would seem to be a perfect example
of the "uninvited ear" referred to in Katz. 32 Since the enclosed phone
booth excluded the public from hearing, only the bookmaker to whom
Katz was talking was expected to receive Katz's communications. In
On Lee the enclosed laundry excluded the public from hearing and
confined the conversation to the defendant and Chin Poy.
The only real difference between the cases is that in On Lee the
electronic device was brought in by one of the parties while in Katz
it was not. Yet this is irrelevant. In both cases an uninvited and un-
known second object received information that was intended only for
one person and was not "knowingly expose[d] to the public."' 33
Implicit in the Katz test is a right of personal control over the quantity
of one's privacy.
The test of privacy as "control . . . over information about our-
selves" 3 is very similar to Katz in this regard. The participant moni-
128. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 802, 18 U.S.C. § 2511
(2) (c) (Supp. IV, 1968).
129. 389 U.S. 347, 363 (1967).
130. Id. at 352.
131. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
132. 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). The fact that the intended receiver obtained the
information over a wire in Katz, but directly in On Lee, should have no real significance
in a privacy analysis.
133. Id. at 351.
134. Fried, Privacy, 77 YAix L.J. 475, 482 (1968).
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tor can not waive the other's right to privacy by secretly changing
the quantity of his privacy."3 5
This same analysis would also apply if the secret agent merely
records the conversation such as occurred in Lopez and Osborn. In
both cases the defendant knew the public could not hear and they
thought they were talking only to the agents. The tape recordings
were "uninvited ears" that were admissible as independent evidence in
a criminal trial, 30 as was done in both cases. In neither On Lee nor
Lopez was there consent for a second recipient of the information.
Nor was the information disclosed to the normal human perceptions
of the public. Yet in Lopez the Court viewed the records as simply
a mechanical aid to the government agent's right to divulge . 37 Under
this view the use of the recorder affects only the quality of a defen-
dant's privacy, which the Supreme Court has reasoned is not protected
by the fourth amendment. 38
C. Secret Agents and the Quality of Privacy
The Court has justified the lack of constitutional protection for the
quality of a person's privacy by reasoning that except where a com-
munication is privileged, a person "assumes the risk" that the person
with whom he speaks will divulge that conversation to the state. 39
But this assertion is not a reason but a conclusion. The public assumes
that risk because the law says it is a risk the public must assume.
The argument also overstates the risk in our society since tort law
135. This is not a third party waiver situation since Chin Poy had no right to
decide who could enter On Lee's laundry. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543 (1968); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
136. It has been almost universally held that sound recordings are admissible in
evidence if properly authenticated. See, e.g., Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C.
Cir. 1950); Calumet Broadcasting Corp. v. F.C.C, 160 F.2d 285 (D.C. Cir. 1947);
People v. MacKenzie, 144 Cal. App. 2d 100, 300 P.2d 700 (1956); People v. Feld, 305
N.Y. 322, 113 N.E.2d 440 (1953).
137. If the Court were to hold the On Lee type of situation was no longer excluded
from the fourth amendment but at the same time follow Lopez in the recorder situa-
tions, that would make fourth amendment protection turn on the time that the con-
versation was disclosed to a regular member of the law enforcement agency, which seems
senseless. It is important to remember that in Katz itself the "uninvited ear" was a tape
recorder.
138. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427 (1963).
139. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373




has long recognized torts involving divulgence and publication. 4 '
The Supreme Court could examine the values underlying the fourth
amendment and write an opinion which would change the risk. Close
personal relationships can only be developed in an atmosphere of
trust. Obviously an aspect of such trust is an expectation that a person
will not divulge the personal information that is disclosed to him.
Intimate relationships are also a vehicle for the development of new
ideas, since the frank comment of friends and associates in response
to one's half-formed and tentative ideas is often essential to creative
social contribution.' In his Lopez dissent, Justice Brennan justified
the constitutional protection of the quantity of privacy on the ground
that "freedom of communications" which is "a postulate of our kind of
society . . . is undermined where people fear to speak unconstrainedly
in what they suppose to be the privacy of home and office."' 42 Yet a
deterrent effect on candid expressions of thought and feeling could
also be caused by a failure to protect private communications against
divulgence.'43
The key element in the protection of the quality of a person's
privacy is the relationship between the parties. If an individual and
the secret agent had forged a relationship of trust based on the sharing
of intimate personal information, ideas and opinions, information dis-
closed to the agent that the source intended to remain private would
be protected.'" Even if the parties do not share intimate personal
140. See text accompanying notes 57 to 65, supra.
141. Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping, 68
COLUSM. L. REV. 189, 216-17 (1968).
142. 373 U.S. 427, 470 (1963).
143. Greenawalt, supra note 141, at 216-17. Professor Greenawalt also raises a
deterrent effect argument against protecting the privacy of communications. He reasons
that such an attempt to limit breaches of confidence would inhibit the freedom of
expression of the recipient of the conversation who would have to be on his guard
not to divulge what was told him. He implies a court would have to determine whether
the divulgence was a breach of the original understanding with the speaker and the
recipient's intent to divulge. Id. at 226. He fails to recognize that the recipient must
have been an agent of the state at the time of the communication in order for there
to be any fourth amendment difficulties. As a state agent the recipient undoubtedly had
the intent to divulge the entire time and whatever understanding he may have had with
the speaker is irrelevant. The deterrent effect he complains about is exactly the one
that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule is supposed to bring about.
144. Whether the agent initiated the conversation or encouraged the source of the
information to discuss an incriminating topic is irrelevant under the fourth amendment
privacy approach. See text accompanying note 122 supra. See also Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966). This is not sufficient coercion to violate the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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information, but instead business information, a court could find that
they had built up such a long-term relationship of mutual trust that
the divulgence was an unreasonable infringement of the victim's
expectations of privacy. This may have been the type of relationship
that existed in Hoffa and On Lee, although the Court's treatment of
these facts in both cases was too cursory to be certain. However where
the confidant is only a first-time customer, as in Lewis, or a new
employee, as in Osborn, there is no trust relationship to be protected
under the fourth amendment.
The expectation that a confidant will not divulge information to
the state must be reasonable. If an individual knew that his confidant
had recently divulged similar information to the state he could not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. An expectation would also
be unreasonable if an individual knew or should have known that his
confidant was a government official with a duty to disclose any in-
formation he obtained to his superiors, as in Lopez.
At least two members of the Court have indicated that communi-
cations to close friends should be protected. Chief Justice Warren's
concurring opinion in Lopez advances this notion as one ground for
overruling On Lee, 45 and his later dissent in Hoffa was based in part
on Partin's friendship with Hoffa. 48 Mr. Justice Douglas indicated
his amenability to this analysis in his separate combined dissent in
Hoffa, Osborn and Lewis where he decried the use of "friend against
friend" by the state. 4"
Another dimension to the quality of a person's privacy is his expec-
tations regarding the ability of his confidant to reproduce the con-
versation or activity in court. If a miniature tape recorder or camera
is viewed simply as an adjunct to a person who is not intruding upon
the quantity of a person's privacy, or even if the recorder is used
only to refresh the agent's recollection, the risk of indulgence is sub-
stantially increased. In his Lopez dissent Mr. Justice Brennan justified
the judicial control of electronic recording by reasoning that informa-
tion which could have been related inaccurately after the fact, could
For a discussion indicating that the fifth amendment does not apply to secret agent
activity see Note, Judicial Control of Secret Agents, 76 YALE L.J. 994 (1967).
145. 373 U.S. 427, 444 (1963).
146. 385 US. 293, 313 (1966).
147. Id. at 347.
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now be related in its entirety, accurately and supported by substantial
independent evidence.14 Where the risk of accurate reproduction sur-
passes normal human capacities the quality of a person's privacy is
abridged and the fourth amendment should be applicable.
The protection of communications to close friends, including family
members, would create a constitutional privilege against divulgence.
Whenever a close friend who secretly becomes a state agent obtains
personal information from an individual and then turns it over to the
state the original source of the information could exclude it, and its
fruits, at his trial. Of course the constitutional privileges would not
be as broad as the evidentiary privileges recognized at common law
since the state could introduce information obtained by a close friend
if they first obtained a search warrant based on probable cause.
Hopefully the Court will soon recognize that its present quantum
of privacy analysis does not protect all legitimate facets of personal
privacy. For if a person reasonably expects that a confidant will not
divulge personal information to the state, that expectation should be
protected by the fourth amendment. Only then can the basic human
need to control the degree of publication of information about one's
self be fully protected by the Constitution.
IV. THE REASONABLENESS OF SECRET AGENT SEARCHES
Just because the fourth amendment is applicable to some kinds of
secret agent activity does not automatically eliminate such activity. It
does mean, however, that secret agent searches must satisfy the various
reasonableness rules adopted by the Court. One of the explanations
for the Court's continued reluctance to extend the fourth amendment
to secret agent activity may have been the fear that such searches
would always be unreasonable and thus would be totally prohibited.49
Under the rules that existed until 1967 this view appears to have been
justified.
In Gouled v. United States'50 the Court had held that a search
could be reasonable only if contraband, stolen articles, or instrumen-
148. 373 U.S. 446, 471 (1963); see also Greenawalt, supra note 141, at 216-17.
149. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Brennan).
150. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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talities of crime were seized. "Mere evidence" agianst the suspect
could not be taken since this would be a form of self-incrimination as
well as a taking of private property. Other decisions held that general
exploratory searches and seizures without prior notice were unreason-
able. 5 ' Then in 1967 the Supreme Court radically reconstructed the
requirements for a reasonable search. The mere evidence rule of
Gouled v. United States"" was overruled in Warden v. Hayden.5 3 In
Berger v. New York' 4 the Court held that an electronic search for
specific information, which ended when the information sought was
obtained, was not a general exploratory search. Finally in Katz v.
United States5 5 the Court found that notice after an electronic search
was completed constituted reasonable notice. The rationale of Berger
and Katz could apply equally to secret agents.
In Camara v. San Francisco'5  and Terry v. Ohio'57 the Court
balanced the need to search against the seriousness of the invasion of
privacy in deciding whether a warrant is needed and the quantum of
evidence required before a search may be instigated. This new test
indicates that the old probable cause requirements need not be applied
in every secret agent case. As the gravity of the crime increases a
lesser standard of prior suspicion or belief may be applied. For
instance, the traditional probable cause standard would be impossible
to meet in long-term spying on organized crime. However, the low
order of gravity of most victimless crime would necessitate a much
higher standard. 58 A higher standard should also be utilized where
intimate information is likely to be revealed because of the severeness
of the "intrusion upon cherished personal security.' 5 °9
Since secret agent activity does not ordinarily involve rapidly
unfolding on-the-street confrontations where prior judicial authoriza-
tion is unfeasible, 6' that traditional requirement should be insisted
151. Sees, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
152. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
153. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
154. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
155. 389 U.S. 347, 355, n.16 (1967).
156. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
157. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
158. See Note, Clandestine Surveillance of Public Toilet Booth Held To Be Un-
reasonable Search, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 955 (1963).
159. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968).
160. Id. at 1.
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upon. However a special situation could arise where a law enforce-
ment official had to act immediately to save lives and the use of a
false identity would be the most felicitous technique to successfully
do so. Any warrants issued to authorize secret agent activity should
describe with particularity the name of the suspect and the crime he is
suspected of committing, the place where the search activity will occur,
the duration, the nature of the information sought, and the kind of
deception authorized.16' Because a decision to utilize a secret agent
means that the government must focus on one or more particular in-
dividuals, in a certain place, enough information to satisfy the warrant
requirement will often be available. 162 Any proposed use of secret
agents to simply gather whatever information they can uncover should
be rejected as an unreasonable exploratory search. Even a more specific
search should be rejected if there is a very low probability of recover-
ing much relevant information. The flexibility of the new reasonable-
ness analysis should make it easily adaptable to all types of secret
agent activity. This section provides some general guidelines for
defining permissible secret agent searches. Obviously specific problems
will have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
CONCLUSION
The 1960's witnessed not only a restructuring of the fourth
amendment reasonableness rules, but also a general expansion of the
applicability of the fourth amendment. The amendment has shifted
from the protection of tangible objects taken by forcible intrusions
in protected places to the protection of all words and activities that
a person has not exposed to the public. Yet the expansion is far from
complete. The Court has used the concepts of standing"e and assump-
161. See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966). This is the kind of informa-
tion now required by statute in most electronic searches. See Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 802, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (Supp. IV 1968).
162. In only one out of six secret agent cases in the Supreme Court, Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 292 (1966), was the quantum of evidence clearly insufficient to support
a search warrant. In Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966), prior judicial authori-
zation was actually obtained.
163. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). The Court held that a con-
spirator had no standing to object to information about his activities obtained through
the overhearing of a conversation between subordinates on a hidden microphone. This
is a perfect example of a quality of privacy issue. Logically Katz v. United States,
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ion of the risk to exclude the problem of divulgence-the quality
of a person's privacy-from fourth amendment protection, with the
result that present fourth amendment doctrine is substantially narrower
than the values the amendment protects. The human need for control
over information about one's self is undermined whether government
agents appear under false identities, or as friends and confidants-
intending all along to breach another's trust. In addition, the Court's
application of its "exposure to the public" test does not withstand
criticism. For a secret agent who assumes a false identity in order to
investigate a business catering to a specially invited class of clientele
is not entering simply as a "member of the public."'16 4 But for all of
their shortcomings the recent fourth amendment privacy cases herald
increased protection of this basic human need. Some secret agent
activity is now clearly within the applicability of the fourth amend-
ment. Perhaps the amendment will continue to be expanded until it
protects all forms of information that a person reasonably expects will
remain private. It is imperative that all secret agent activity that
infringes upon personal privacy be brought under the control of the
judiciary. Only then can the "indefeasible right of personal security
[and] personal liberty" promised in Boyd v. United States'65 over
eighty years ago be realized.
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